Eminent Domain Update: Fourth Circuit Upholds Landowner’s Right To Testify on Property Value and Splits With First Circuit on Expert Testimony Standard

By Benjamin J. Mills and Jeremy J. Stewart

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently announced two important rules in two eminent domain opinions. Both cases involved pipeline access easements that the condemnor properly took under the Natural Gas Act. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.32 Acres of Land, 127 F.4th 427 (4th Cir. 2025) (“Mountain Valley I”); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 9.89 Acres of Land, 127 F.4th 437 (4th Cir. 2025) (“Mountain Valley II”). The appeals in those cases dealt with the exclusion of evidence bearing on the valuation of the properties and just compensation. The key lessons are that: (1) landowners may testify about the value of their property, and (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(h)’s instruction for district courts to try all issues other than just compensation in federal eminent domain lawsuits does not alter the typical standards governing the admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Mountain Valley I dealt with the condemnation of a 0.32-acre access easement on the corner of the landowner’s property. The taking was proper, and the only remaining issue was the amount of just compensation owed. The landowner appealed the district court’s exclusion of two pieces of evidence: (1) the landowner’s own testimony, and (2) her expert’s appraisal. The Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed on both issues.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with the landowner on the first argument, holding that the “district court abused its discretion by preventing… the landowner… from testifying” about the value of her property. Mountain Valley I, 127 F.4that 432. In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit reiterated the common law presumption that landowners may testify about the value of their property, which presumption is oftentimes “justified by… landowner[s’] special knowledge of their land.” Id. at 432–33. Of course, a landowner must have a valid foundation and meet all the other typical evidentiary prerequisites to so testify, but the landowner met those requirements in this instance. Id. at 433. More specifically, the district court erred in excluding the landowner’s testimony because she had personal knowledge of the land (which had been in her family’s possession since the 1840s) and “[t]he comparability of sales,” on which she relied and for which the district court faulted her, “goes to weight, not admissibility, and is a matter for the fact finder.” Id. at 433–34. In short, the landowner will be allowed to testify as to the value of her property on remand.

In that same opinion, the Fourth Circuit also held that the district court’s exclusion of the expert’s appraisal applied “erroneous” legal standards. Id. at 435. The district court had concluded that its gatekeeping role was particularly pronounced in condemnation cases, a conclusion it based on: (1) Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(h), which instructs courts to “tr[y] all issues” other than (in some cases) that of just compensation; and (2) a First Circuit opinion, United States v. 33.92356 Acres of Land, 585 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009), which adopted the heightened standard. Id. at 432. In other words, the district court applied a heightened standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. The Fourth Circuit rejected this approach. It reasoned that Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 “does not change the court’s standard Federal Rule of Evidence 702 analysis.” Id. at 435. Rather than heightening the test of admissibility or allowing a district court to determine factual issues at that stage, a typical admissibility analysis is all that is appropriate, regardless of whether the case sounds in eminent domain. Id.

On this point, the Fourth Circuit’s second opinion – Mountain Valley II – arrives at the same holding for at least two reasons. See Mountain Valley II, 127 F.4th at 440–41. First, “the separate stages of eminent domain proceedings should be kept analytically distinct.” Id. at 443.“[D]istrict courts must first determine the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence and then try issues under Rule 71.1(h) by considering all admissible evidence together.” Id. at 440–41. Second, “[c]ourts should apply the Federal Rules of Evidence identically in eminent domain cases as in other cases.” Id. at 443. This is because the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to all federal court proceedings (none of the exceptions apply to an eminent domain action), and nothing in Rule 71.1’s text or even advisory committee notes suggest any modification of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. In sum, Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 does not alter the typical procedures and evidentiary analyses for reviewing expert testimony in federal eminent domain cases.

Together, these two Fourth Circuit opinions create a circuit split between the First and Fourth Circuits. As noted, the First Circuit’s view is that a district court’s gatekeeping function is “particularly pronounced in condemnation proceedings under Rule 71.1.” Id. at 443 (quoting 33.92356 Acres of Land, 585 F.3d at 8). The Fourth Circuit disagrees. Time will tell how other federal district and circuit courts deal with this issue and whether the U.S. Supreme Court eventually resolves the split.