Statutory Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Opinions in Fischer v. United States and Cargill v. Garland

By V.R. Bohman and Cameron J. Schlagel

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Fischer v. United States¹ and Garland v. Cargill² provide valuable perspectives on statutory interpretation. In Fischer v. United States, the Court held that the obstruction of justice provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), requires the government to prove the defendant impaired the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. In Garland v. Cargill, the Court held that a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock does not qualify as a “machinegun” under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).

These cases demonstrate the contrasting methodologies of textualism and purposivism, as well as the nuanced differences that can arise even within a single interpretive framework. This article explores the textualist analyses in the majority opinions of both cases, the use of legislative history in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Fischer, and the purposivist approach in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Cargill. Additionally, we contrast Justice Barrett’s dissent in Fischer to highlight how reasonable minds applying the same principles can reach disparate results.

Textualist Analysis in the Majority Opinions

The majority opinions in Fischer and Cargill adopted a textualist analysis, focusing on the ordinary meaning of the statutory text in its context and structure, and avoiding legislative history or policy considerations. In both cases, the Court employed specific canons of interpretation including the following:

Applying these canons in Fischer, the Court interpreted the phrase “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding” in § 1512(c)(2) as being limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in § 1512(c)(1), which all involve actions that impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for use in an official proceeding.⁷ The Court reasoned that the word “otherwise” in (c)(2) was designed to fill any inadvertent gaps in the focused language of (c)(1), and that reading (c)(2) as covering all forms of obstructive conduct would render (c)(1) superfluous, undermining Congress’s careful calibration of penalties for different types of obstruction.⁸ To confirm its interpretation, the majority emphasized the history and context of § 1512(c), which was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to the Enron accounting scandal and the document shredding by Arthur Andersen LLP.⁹ The Court concluded it would be odd for Congress to include a sweeping catchall provision that reaches far beyond the scenarios that prompted the legislation.

In Cargill, the Court interpreted the term “machinegun” in § 5845(b) as excluding a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a device that harnesses the recoil energy of the rifle to enable rapid fire, commonly known as a bump stock. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas explains that the statutory definition of “machinegun” requires that the weapon be able to fire more than one shot “automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger.”¹⁰ The Court defined “function of the trigger” as “the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism,” and concluded that a bump stock does not enable a weapon to fire automatically by a single function of the trigger, because each shot requires a separate action of the trigger and corresponding reset of the trigger mechanism.¹¹ It also rejected the argument that a bump stock enables a weapon to fire automatically because it requires only continuous forward pressure on the front grip or barrel, holding that such pressure is not part of the trigger’s function, and that automatic fire means zero or minimal additional human input.¹²

Legislative History and Textualism: Justice Jackson’s Concurring Opinion in Fischer

Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Fischer exemplifies how legislative history can be used to confirm a textualist interpretation.¹³ While the majority opinion focuses on the statutory text and canons of construction, Justice Jackson delves into the legislative history to reinforce the Court’s textual analysis. The legislative history of § 1512(c), Justice Jackson explained, supports the majority’s textual interpretation by showing that Congress enacted the provision to target document destruction and to close statutory loopholes that had been exposed by the Enron scandal.¹⁴ The legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, demonstrated that Congress drafted § 1512(c) to fill the gaps in the existing obstruction of justice statutes and to criminalize the destruction of evidence with the intent of obstructing any type of investigation within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.¹⁵ However, there was no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction statute that would obviate the need for any other obstruction prohibitions, thus confirming the Court’s interpretation of the statutory text.

Justice Jackson’s use of legislative history as evidence of the legislature’s contemporaneous understanding demonstrates that legislative history can be a valuable tool for textualists when used to support, rather than supplant, the plain meaning of a statute.

Purposivist Approach: Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent in Cargill

The textualist interpretations of the majority opinions in both cases contrast with the purposivist approach that Justice Sotomayor employed in her dissent in Cargill.¹⁶ A purposivist approach to statutory interpretation focuses on the underlying goals or objectives that Congress sought to achieve by enacting a statute and seeks to construe the statutory language in a way that best advances those goals or objectives, even if it requires departing from the ordinary meaning of the text or reading in words or other elements that do not appear on the statute’s face.

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent exemplifies this approach by arguing that the majority’s interpretation of § 5845(b) “eviscerates Congress’s regulation of machineguns and enables gun users and manufacturers to circumvent federal law.”¹⁷ In her view, the majority’s definition of “function of the trigger” – as the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism – is too narrow and technical.¹⁸ That term should instead be understood as the initiation of the firing sequence by an act of the shooter, whether via a pull, push, or switch of the firing mechanism. Furthermore, the majority’s definition of “automatic” as requiring zero or minimal human input is too strict, and that the term should instead be understood as requiring only continuous fire with a single initiation of the trigger.¹⁹ Justice Sotomayor supports her interpretation by appealing to dictionary definitions, evidence of contemporaneous usage, the Court’s prior interpretation of the NFA, and ATF’s longstanding practice of classifying devices that enable continuous fire with a single pull of the trigger as machineguns.²⁰ Ultimately, she invokes the consequences of the majority’s interpretation, which she claims would render Congress’s clear intent readily evadable and facilitate the proliferation of dangerous weapons that can achieve a rate of fire that rivals traditional machineguns.²¹

Contrasting Textualist and Purposivist Approaches

The textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation often lead to different outcomes, as illustrated by the majority opinions and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Cargill. Textualists prioritize the plain meaning of the statutory text and use canons of construction to resolve ambiguities. They view the text as the primary source of legislative intent and are cautious about relying on extrinsic materials like legislative history.

Purposivists, on the other hand, focus on the broader purpose and policy goals of the statute. They are more willing to consider legislative history, context, and the practical implications of different interpretations to reach applications that may not readily appear on the statute’s face. Purposivists aim to interpret statutes in a way that furthers their understanding of the statute’s underlying objectives, even if it requires a more flexible reading of the text.

In Fischer, the textualist majority and Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion aligned in their interpretation of §1512(c)(2), with Justice Jackson using legislative history to confirm the textualist reading. In Cargill, the textualist majority and Justice Sotomayor’s purposivist dissent diverged sharply, with the majority focusing on the mechanics of the trigger function and the dissent emphasizing the NFA’s purpose of regulating rapid-fire weapons.

Reasonable Disagreement: Justice Barrett’s Dissent in Fischer

Justice Barrett’s dissent in Fischer illustrates that reasonable minds can disagree over the proper application of the canons of statutory interpretation.²² Justice Barrett agrees with the majority that a textualist analysis is appropriate, but disagrees with the majority’s application of the canons of interpretation to the phrase “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding” in § 1512(c)(2). She argues that the word “otherwise” in (c)(2) means “in a different manner,” “by other means,” or “in other respects.”²³ Thus, it is a catchall phrase that covers all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than the conduct that is already covered by (c)(1). Justice Barrett further contends that the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons do not apply to (c)(2), because it is not a list of terms that includes an ambiguous word, nor a general or collective term following a list of specific items, but rather a distinct and independent prohibition.²⁴ She also argues that the surplusage canon does not support the majority’s interpretation, because (c)(2) still leaves room for other obstruction offenses that do not require an official proceeding, and because the majority’s interpretation itself creates substantial overlap and redundancy.²⁵ Finally, according to Justice Barrett, the majority’s interpretation is inconsistent with the history and context of § 1512(c), which was enacted to close the Enron gap and to avoid future surprises, not to limit the scope of obstruction liability.²⁶ She therefore concludes that the majority’s interpretation defies the plain meaning of the statutory text and the prerogatives of the political branches.

Justice Barrett’s dissent highlights the inherent challenges and complexities of statutory interpretation. Even within a textualist framework, judges can reach different conclusions based on their understanding of the statutory language, context, and canons of construction. Justice Barrett’s dissent thus underscores that statutory interpretation is not a mechanical process, but rather requires reasoned judgment.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Fischer and Cargill provide valuable insights into the process of statutory interpretation and the contrasting methodologies of textualism and purposivism. They underscore the importance of careful reasoning and judgment in interpreting statutes and the ongoing debate over the best methodologies to do so.